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Abstract
This paper investigates the price-based resource allocation strategies for the uplink transmission of a
spectrum-sharing femtocell network, in which a central macrocell is underlaid with distributed femtocells,
all operating over the same frequency band as the macrocell. Assuming that the macrocell base station
(MBS) protects itself by pricing the interference from the femtocell users, a Stackelberg game is formulated
to study the joint utility maximization of the macrocell and the femtocells subject to a maximum tolerable
interference power constraint at the MBS. Especially, two practical femtocell channel models: sparsely
deployed scenario for rural areas and densely deployed scenario for urban areas, are investigated. For each
scenario, two pricing schemes: uniform pricing and non-uniform pricing, are proposed. Then, the Stackelberg
equilibriums for these proposed games are studied, and an effective distributed interference price bargaining
algorithm with guaranteed convergence is proposed for the uniform-pricing case. Finally, numerical examples
are presented to verify the proposed studies. It is shown that the proposed algorithms are effective in resource
allocation and macrocell protection requiring minimal network overhead for spectrum-sharing-based two-tier
femtocell networks.
Index Terms
Distributed power control, femtocell networks, Stackelberg game, spectrum sharing, interference man-
agement, game theory.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the most promising technologies for improving the indoor experience of cellular mobile users,
femtocell has attracted considerable attentions since it was first proposed. A femtocell is enabled by a home
base station (HBS) that is connected to the service provider via the third party backhaul (e.g. DSL or
cable moderm). HBSs, also known as Home NodeBs, are short-range low-power base stations deployed and
managed by the customers at home or in the offices [1]. With the help of such HBS, femtocell users can
experience better indoor voice and data reception, and lower their transmit power for prolonging battery life.
From the network operator’s perspective, HBS offsets the burden on the macrocell base station (MBS),
consequently improving the network coverage and capacity.
In practice, a two-tier femtocell network is usually implemented by sharing spectrum rather than splitting
spectrum between tiers. This is due to the following reasons: (i) Scarce availability of spectrum; (ii) Absence
of coordination between the macrocell and femtocells on spectrum allocation; (iii) High requirement on
mobile devices (which need to support switching between different bands in the splitting-spectrum approach).
Therefore, it is more favorable to operate the macrocell and femtocells in a shared-spectrum from either
an infrastructure or spectrum availability perspective. However, for spectrum-sharing two-tier femtocell
networks, the cross-tier and inter-cell interference greatly restrict the network performance. Therefore, the
interference mitigation in two-tier femtocell networks has become an active area of research. A great deal
of scholarly work has recently appeared in the literature on the design of power control and interference
mitigation strategies for spectrum-sharing femtocell networks. In [2], a self-configuration transmit power
allocation strategy based on the measured received signal power level from the MBS was developed. In [3],
the authors proposed a distributed utility-based Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) adaptation
algorithm to alleviate the cross-tier interference. In [4], the authors proposed interference mitigation strategies
in which femtocell users adjust their maximum transmit power to suppress the cross-tier interference to the
macrocell. In [5], OFDMA-based femtocell networks were proposed to manage the interference between
macrocell and femtocells. In [6], a macrocell beam subset selection strategy, which is able to maximize
the throughput of the macrocell, was proposed to reduce the cross-tier interference between the macrocell
and femtocell users. In [7], to manage the cross-tier interference and minimize the interference coordination
communication between the macrocell and femtocells, an effective interference control scheme was proposed
to partition the macrocell’s bandwidth into subbands and allow the femtocell users adaptively allocate power
over the subbands. In [8], the capacity of a two-tier femtocell network was studied with a practical interference
suppression technology. In [9], a distributed Q-learning algorithm that requires minimum network overhead
and maximizes the network performance was proposed to manage the interference in femtocell networks.
On the other hand, spectrum sharing with interference control is not unique to femtocell networks, since
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3it is also an important design approach for cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In a CRN, secondary users
are allowed to transmit over the frequency bands of primary users as long as their resulted aggregate
interference is kept below an acceptable level. This constraint is known as interference temperature constraint
or interference power constraint [10]. With secondary users designing resource allocation strategies subject to
such an interference power constraint, the interference received at the primary user is effectively controlled.
A great deal of power allocation polices and interference control strategies have been proposed for spectrum-
sharing CRNs. For example, the optimal power allocation strategies to maximize the capacity of the secondary
user with an effective protection of the primary user were studied in [11], [12] for spectrum-sharing
CRNs. The transmission-capacity tradeoff in a spectrum-sharing CRN was investigated subject to an outage
constraint in [13]. Power and rate control strategies for spectrum-sharing cognitive radios were studied via
dynamic programming under the interference temperature constraint in [14]. The spectrum-sharing problems
for CRNs have also been extensively studied via game theory. In [15], the authors developed a fair and
self-enforcing dynamic spectrum leasing mechanism via power control games. Game-theory-based power
control strategies to maximize the utility for spectrum-sharing CRNs were also investigated in [16] using
Stackelberg game, in [17] using repeated Cournot game, and in [18] using evolutionary game, respectively.
Interference power constraint has been proved to be a practically useful technique to control the interference
in spectrum-sharing CRNs. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it has not been applied to the
design of interference control strategies for femtocell networks. The main difficulty for such an application
lies in the following fact: Unlike the cognitive radio devices, the femtocell users are ordinary mobile
terminals that may not have the environment-aware sensing and self power-adaptation capabilities to control
the interference to the macrocell or other underlaid femtocells. Therefore, imposing interference power
constraints at the femtocell user side to implement the interference control in femtocell networks becomes
unpractical. In this paper, by exploiting the unique feature of femtocell networks, we apply the interference
power constraint to the design of interference control for the uplink transmission of femtocell networks
in a new way: Instead of imposing interference power constraints at the femtocell user side, we assume
that such constraints are imposed by the MBS, which controls the received interference through pricing the
interference from femtocell users. The corresponding interference prices are sent to femtocell users through
the existing backhaul links between the MBS and HBSs. This way, femtocell users are able to design their
power allocation strategies in a decentralized manner based on the interference prices received from their
own HBSs. Comparing to existing approaches in the literature, our proposed method perfectly controls
the cross-tier interference for femtocell networks, and at the same time greatly reduces the complexity of
resource allocation implemented by the femtocell users.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
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4• By bringing the interference power constraint concept from CRNs to the design of the uplink cross-tier
interference control for the two-tier spectrum-sharing femtocell networks, this paper proposes a new
price-based resource allocation scheme for femtocell users, whereby the MBS controls the transmit
power of femtocell users by pricing their resulted interference power levels at the MBS receiver subject
to a maximum tolerable interference margin.
• This paper formulates a Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the revenue of the macrocell and the
individual utilities of different femtocell users for the proposed price-based resource allocation. More
specifically, the interference tolerance margin at the MBS is used as the resource that the leader (MBS)
and the followers (femtocell users) in the formulated Stackelberg game compete for, under which
simple and effective price-based resource allocation strategies are obtained. In this paper, we propose
two pricing schemes: non-uniform pricing in which different interference-power prices are assigned to
different femtocell users, and uniform pricing in which a uniform price applies to all the femtocell users.
In addition, in the uniform-pricing case, we develop a distributed interference bargaining algorithm that
requires minimal network information exchange between the MBS and HBSs. We show that the non-
uniform pricing scheme is optimal from the perspective of revenue maximization for the MBS, while
the uniform pricing scheme maximizes the sum-rate of femtocell users.
• This paper studies the Stackelberg equilibriums for the proposed power allocation games with non-
uniform or uniform pricing under two types of practical femtocell channel models: sparsely deployed
scenario applicable for rural areas in which the interference channels across different femtocells are
ignored, and densely deployed scenario for urban areas in which the cross-femtocell interference is
assumed to be present, but subject to certain peak power constraint. Moreover, for the sparsely deployed
scenario, we obtain the closed-form expressions for the optimal interference price and power allocation
solutions, while for the densely deployed scenario, lower and upper bounds on the achievable revenue
for the MBS are obtained by applying the solutions in the sparsely deployed case.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model. Section III formulates
the Stackelberg game for price-based resource allocation. Sections IV and V investigate the Stackelberg
equilibriums and the optimal price and power allocation solutions for the sparsely deployed scenario and
densely deployed scenario, respectively. Section VI provides numerical examples to validate the proposed
studies. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a two-tier femtocell network consisting of one central MBS serving a region
R, within which there are in total N femtocells deployed by home or office users. It is assumed that all
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5femtocells access the same frequency band as the macrocell. In each femtocell, there is one dedicated HBS
providing service for several wireless devices. Each wireless device is regarded as one user in the femtocell
network. For analytical tractability, we assume that at any given frequency band (e.g., one frequency sub-
channel in OFDMA-based femtocells), there is at most one scheduled active user during each signaling
time-slot in each femtocell, i.e., orthogonal uplink transmission is adopted. In this paper, we focus our study
on the uplink transmission in the femtocell network over a single frequency band, while it is worth pointing
out that the results obtained under this assumption can be easily extended to broadband femtocell systems
with parallel frequency sub-channels using the “dual decomposition” technique similarly as [19].
Under the above framework, for a given time-slot, the uplink transmission for the two-tier femtocell
network can be described in Fig. 1. As shown in Fig. 1, user i denotes the scheduled user transmitting to
its HBS Bi, where i = 1, 2, · · · , N . All the terminals involved are assumed to be equipped with a single
antenna. For the purpose of exposition, all the channels involved are assumed to be block-fading, i.e., the
channels remain constant during each transmission block, but possibly change from one block to another.
The channel power gain of the link between user i and HBS Bj is denoted by hj,i. The channel power gain
of the link between user i and the MBS is given by gi. All the channel power gains are assumed to be
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables (RVs) each having a continuous probability
density function (PDF). The additive noises at HBSs and MBS are assumed to be independent circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) RVs, each of which is assumed to have zero mean and variance σ2.
We consider two practical femtocell channel models: sparsely deployed scenario and densely deployed
scenario. For the sparsely deployed scenario, we assume that the mutual interference between the femtocells
is neglected. This is because the channel power gain drops sharply with the increasing of the distance
between femtocells due to path loss (which is proportional to d−α, where d is the distance and α is the path
loss exponent). Besides, since femtocells are usually deployed indoor, the penetration loss is also significant.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the interference between femtocells can be neglected when the
femtocells are sparsely deployed. In practice, this scenario is applicable to the femtocell networks deployed
in rural areas where the distances between femtocells are usually large. While for the urban areas, where the
femtocells are close to each other and thus the mutual interference between femtocells cannot be ignored,
the sparsely deployed scenario may not be suitable. For such situations, we consider the densely deployed
scenario that takes the mutual interference between different femtocells into account. Especially, for this
scenario, we assume that the aggregate interference at user i’s receiver due to all the other femtocell users
is bounded, i.e.,
∑N
j=1,j 6=i I
F
j ≤ ε, where ε denotes the bound and IFj denotes the power of the interference
from femtocell user j. This assumption is valid due to the following facts: (i) the cross-femtocell channel
power gains are usually very weak due to the penetration loss; and (ii) the peak transmit power of each
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Notation: In this paper, the boldface capital and lowercase letters are used to denote matrices and vectors,
respectively. The inequalities for vectors are defined element-wise, i.e., x  y represents xi ≤ yi, ∀i, where
xi and yi are the ith elements of the vector x and y, respectively. The superscript T denotes the transpose
operation of a vector.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the Stackelberg game formulation for the price-based power allocation
scheme. Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game is investigated.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
In this paper, we assume that the maximum interference that the MBS can tolerate is Q, i.e., the aggregate
interference from all the femtocell users should not be larger than Q. Mathematically, this can be written as
N∑
i=1
Ii ≤ Q, (1)
where Ii denotes the power of the interference from femtocell user i. This constraint is known as interference
power constraint or interference temperature constraint in CRNs.
Different from the cognitive radio studies, in this paper, we assume that such an interference power
constraint is imposed at the MBS, which protects itself through pricing the interference from the femtocell
users. The Stackelberg game model [20] is thus applied in this scenario. Stackelberg game is a strategic game
that consists of a leader and several followers competing with each other on certain resources. The leader
moves first and the followers move subsequently. In this paper, we formulate the MBS as the leader, and the
femtocell users as the followers. The MBS (leader) imposes a set of prices on per unit of received interference
power from each femtocell user. Then, the femtocell users (followers) update their power allocation strategies
to maximize their individual utilities based on the assigned interference prices.
Under the above game model, it is easy to observe that the MBS’s objective is to maximize its revenue
obtained from selling the interference quota to femtocell users. Mathematically, the revenue of MBS can be
calculated by
UMBS (µ,p) =
N∑
i=1
µiIi(pi), (2)
where µ is the interference price vector with µ = [µ1, µ2, · · · , µN ]T , with µi denoting the interference
price for user i; Ii(pi) is the interference power received from femtocell user i, and p is a vector of
power levels for femtocell users with p = [p1, p2, · · · , pN ]T . Note that ∀i, pi is actually a function of µi
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femtocell user is willing to buy is dependent on its assigned interference price. Since the maximum aggregate
interference that the MBS can tolerate is limited, the MBS needs to find the optimal interference prices µ
to maximize its revenue within its tolerable aggregate interference margin. This is obtained by solving the
following optimization problem:
Problem 3.1:
max
µ0
UMBS (µ,p) , (3)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
Ii(pi) ≤ Q. (4)
At the femtocell users’ side, the received SINR at HBS Bi for user i can be written as
γi
(
pi,p−i
)
=
pihi,i∑
j 6=i pjhi,j + σ
2
i
,∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} . (5)
where σ2i is the background noise at HBS Bi taking into account of the interference from the macrocell users,
and p−i is a vector of power allocation for all users except user i, i.e., p−i = [p1, · · · , pi−1, pi+1, · · · , pN ]T .
Without loss of generality, it is assumed for convenience that σ2i = σ2,∀i in the rest of this paper.
The utility for user i can be defined as
Ui
(
pi,p−i, µi
)
= λi log
(
1 + γi
(
pi,p−i
))− µiIi(pi), (6)
where λi is the utility gain per unit transmission rate for user i, and Ii(pi) is the interference quota that user
i intends to buy from the MBS under the interference price µi with Ii(pi) , gipi. It is observed from (6)
that the utility function of each femtocell user consists of two parts: profit and cost. If the femtocell user
increases its transmit power, the transmission rate increases, and so does the profit. On the other hand, with
the increasing of the transmit power, the femtocell user will definitely cause more interference to the MBS.
As a result, it has to buy more interference quota from the MBS, which increases the cost. Therefore, power
allocation strategies are needed at the femtocell users to maximize their own utilities. Mathematically, for
each user i, this problem can be formulated as
Problem 3.2:
max
pi
Ui
(
pi,p−i,µ
)
, (7)
s.t. pi ≥ 0. (8)
Problems 3.1 and 3.2 together form a Stackelberg game. The objective of this game is to find the
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) point(s) from which neither the leader (MBS) nor the followers (femtocell
users) have incentives to deviate. The SE for the proposed game is investigated in the following subsection.
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8B. Stackelberg Equilibrium
For the proposed Stackelberg game, the SE is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1: Let µ∗ be a solution for Problem 3.1 and p∗i be a solution for Problem 3.2 of the ith user.
Then, the point (µ∗,p∗) is a SE for the proposed Stackelberg game if for any (µ,p) with µ  0 and p  0,
the following conditions are satisfied:
UMBS (µ
∗,p∗) ≥ UMBS (µ,p∗) , (9)
Ui
(
p∗i ,p
∗
−i,µ
∗
) ≥ Ui (pi,p∗−i,µ∗) ,∀i. (10)
Generally, the SE for a Stackelberg game can be obtained by finding its subgame perfect Nash Equi-
librium (NE). In the proposed game, it is not difficult to see that the femtocell users strictly compete in a
noncooperative fashion. Therefore, a noncooperative power control subgame is formulated at the femtocell
users’ side. For a noncooperative game, NE is defined as the operating point(s) at which no player can
improve utility by changing its strategy unilaterally, assuming everyone else continues to use its current
strategy. At the MBS’s side, since there is only one player, the best response of the MBS can be readily
obtained by solving Problem 3.1. To achieve this end, the best response functions for the followers (femtocell
users) must be obtained first, since the leader (MBS) derives its best response function based on those of the
followers or femtocell users. For the proposed game in this paper, the SE can be obtained as follows: For a
given µ, Problem 3.2 is solved first. Then, with the obtained best response functions p∗ of the femtocells,
we solve Problem 3.1 for the optimal interference price µ∗.
It is not difficult to see that, in the above formulation, we assume that the MBS charges each femtocell
user with a different interference price. We thus refer to this pricing scheme as non-uniform pricing. In
addition, we consider a special case of this pricing scheme referred to as uniform pricing, in which the MBS
charges each femtocell with the same interference price, i.e., µi = µ,∀i. In the following, these two pricing
schemes are investigated for the sparsely deployed scenario and the densely deployed scenario, respectively.
IV. SPARSELY DEPLOYED SCENARIO
In the sparsely deployed scenario, we assume that the femtocells are sparsely deployed within the
macrocell. Under this assumption, the mutual interference between any pair of femtocells is negligible
and thus ignored, i.e., hi,j = 0,∀i 6= j. In this scenario, since the inter-femtocell interference is ignored, the
problem of solving price-based resource allocation is simplified, which enables us to get the closed-form
price and power allocation solutions for the formulated Stackelberg game. As will be shown in the next
section, these solutions will enlighten us on the power allocation strategies for the more general densely
deployed scenario as well.
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9In this case, SINR given in (5) can be approximated by
γi
(
pi,p−i
) ≈ pihi,i
σ2
,∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} . (11)
Next, we consider the two pricing schemes: non-uniform pricing and uniform pricing, respectively. Then,
we compare these two schemes, highlight their advantages and disadvantages for implementation, and point
out the best situation under which each scheme should be applied.
A. Non-Uniform Pricing
For the non-uniform pricing scheme, the MBS sets different interference prices for different femtocell
users. If we denote the interference price for user i as µi, for the sparsely deployed scenario, Problem 3.2
can be simplified as
Problem 4.1:
max
pi
λi log
(
1 +
pihi,i
σ2
)
− µigipi, (12)
s.t. pi ≥ 0. (13)
It is observed that the objective function is a concave function over pi, and the constraint is affine. Thus,
Problem 4.1 is a convex optimization problem. For a convex optimization problem, the optimal solution must
satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Therefore, by solving the KKT conditions, the optimal
solution for Problem 4.1 can be easily obtained in the following lemma. Details are omitted for brevity.
Lemma 4.1: For a given interference price µi, the optimal solution for Problem 4.1 is given by
p∗i =


λi
µigi
− σ2
hi,i
, if µi < λihi,igiσ2 ,
0, otherwise.
(14)
From Lemma 4.1, it is observed that if the interference price is too high, i.e., µi > λihi,igiσ2 , user i will not
transmit. This indicates that user i will be removed from the game.
We can rewrite the power allocation strategy given in (14) as
p∗i =
(
λi
µigi
− σ
2
hi,i
)+
, ∀i, (15)
with (·)+ , max (·, 0). Substituting (15) into Problem 3.1, the optimization problem at the MBS side can
be formulated as
Problem 4.2:
max
µ<0
N∑
i=1
(
λi − µigiσ
2
hi,i
)+
, (16)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
(
λi
µi
− giσ
2
hi,i
)+
≤ Q. (17)
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Note that the above problem is non-convex, since the object function is a convex function of µ (maxi-
mization of a convex function is in general non-convex). Nevertheless, it is shown in the following that this
problem can be converted to a series of convex subproblems.
For user i, we introduce the following indicator function
χi =

 1, if µi <
λihi,i
giσ2
,
0, otherwise.
(18)
With the above indicator functions for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , Problem 4.2 can be reformulated as
Problem 4.3:
max
χ, µ<0
N∑
i=1
χi
(
λi − µigiσ
2
hi,i
)
, (19)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
χi
(
λi
µi
− giσ
2
hi,i
)
≤ Q, (20)
χi ∈ {0, 1},∀i, (21)
where χ , [χ1, χ2, · · · , χN ]T . It is not difficult to see that the above problem is non-convex due to χ.
However, this problem has a nice property that is explored as follows. For a given indicator vector χ, it is
easy to verify that Problem 4.3 is convex.
Next, we consider a special case of Problem 4.3 by assuming that Q is large enough such that all the
users are admitted. As a result, the indicators for all users are equal to 1, i.e., µi < λihi,igiσ2 ,∀ i. Under this
assumption, Problem 4.3 can be transformed to the following form
Problem 4.4:
min
µ<0
N∑
i=1
µigiσ
2
hi,i
, (22)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
λi
µi
≤ Q+
N∑
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
. (23)
Obviously, this problem is convex. The optimal solution of this problem is given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.1: The optimal solution to Problem 4.4 is given by
µ∗i =
√
λihi,i
giσ2
∑N
i=1
√
λigiσ2
hi,i
Q+
∑N
i=1
giσ2
hi,i
,∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} . (24)
Proof: Please refer to Part A of the appendix.
Now, we relate the optimal solution of Problem 4.4 to that of the original problem, i.e., Problem 4.2, in
the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.2: The interference prices given by (24) are the optimal solutions of Problem 4.2 if and
only if (iff) Q >
∑
N
i=1
√
λigiσ
2
hi,i
mini
√
λihi,i
giσ
2
−∑Ni=1 giσ2hi,i .
Proof: Please refer to Part B of the appendix.
With the results obtained above, we are now ready for solving Problem 4.2. The optimal solution of
Problem 4.2 is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1: Assuming that all the femtocell users are sorted in the order λ1h1,1
g1σ2
> · · · > λN−1hN−1,N−1
gN−1σ2
>
λNhN,N
gNσ2
, the optimal solution for Problem 4.2 is given by
µ∗ =


∑
N
i=1
√
λigiσ
2
hi,i
Q+
∑
N
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
[
√
λ1h1,1
g1σ2
,
√
λ2h2,2
g2σ2
, · · · ,
√
λNhN,N
gNσ2
]T , if Q > TN
∑
N−1
i=1
√
λigiσ
2
hi,i
Q+
∑
N−1
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
[
√
λ1h1,1
g1σ2
, · · · ,
√
λN−1hN−1,N−1
gN−1σ2
,∞]T , if TN ≥ Q > TN−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
∑
2
i=1
√
λigiσ
2
hi,i
Q+
∑
2
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
[
√
λ1h1,1
g1σ2
,
√
λ2h2,2
g2σ2
,∞, · · · ,∞]T , if T3 ≥ Q > T2
√
λ1g1σ
2
h1,1
Q+
g1σ
2
h1,1
[
√
λ1h1,1
g1σ2
,∞, · · · ,∞]T , if T2 ≥ Q > T1
, (25)
where TN =
∑
N
i=1
√
λigiσ
2
hi,i√
λNhN,N
gNσ
2
−∑Ni=1 giσ2hi,i , TN−1 =
∑
N−1
i=1
√
λigiσ
2
hi,i√
λN−1hN−1,N−1
gN−1σ
2
−∑N−1i=1 giσ2hi,i , · · · , T2 =
∑
2
i=1
√
λigiσ
2
hi,i√
λ2h2,2
g2σ
2
−
∑
2
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
, and T1 =
√
λ1g1σ
2
h1,1√
λ1h1,1
g1σ
2
− g1σ2
h1,1
= 0.
Proof: If Q > TN , the optimal µ∗ is readily obtained by Proposition 4.2. For other intervals of Q,
e.g., TN−1 ≤ Q ≤ TN , the proof of the optimality for the corresponding µ∗ can be obtained similarly as
Proposition 4.2, and is thus omitted. The proof of Theorem 4.1 thus follows.
Remark: From the system design perspective, the results given in (25) are very useful in practice. For
instance, if the MBS sets the interference price for a user to ∞, this user will not transmit; however, if
the system is designed to admit all the N femtocell users, the interference tolerance margin Q at the MBS
needs to be set to be above TN .
Now, the Stackelberg game for the sparsely deployed scenario with non-uniform pricing is completely
solved. The SE for this Stackelberg game is then given as follows.
Proposition 4.3: The SE for the Stackelberg game formulated in Problems 4.1 and 4.2 is (µ∗,p∗), where
µ∗ is given by (25), and p∗ is given by (14).
In practice, the proposed game can be implemented as follows.
First, for any femtocell user i, the MBS measures its channel gain, gi, and collects other information such
as λi and hi,i, from HBS i through the backhaul link. The MBS then computes λihi,igiσ2 for all i’s and use
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them to compute the threshold vector T = [TN , TN−1, · · · , T1]T by Theorem 4.1.
Second, with the obtained threshold vector T , the MBS decides the interference price for each femtocell
user based on its available interference margin Q according to (25). Then, the interference prices are fed
back to femtocell users through the backhaul links between the MBS and the HBSs.
Finally, after receiving the interference prices from their respective HBSs, the femtocell users decide their
transmit power levels according to (14).
Moreover, based on the special structure of (25), we propose the following algorithm to compute the
interference prices for the femtocell users at the MBS.
Algorithm 4.1: Successive User Removal
• Step 1: Set K = N .
• Step 2: Sort the K users according to λihi,i
giσ2
(i.e., λ1h1,1
g1σ2
> · · · > λK−1hK−1,K−1
gK−1σ2
> λKhK,K
gKσ2
).
• Step 3: Compute qK =
∑
N
i=1
√
λigiσ
2
hi,i
Q+
∑
N
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
.
• Step 4: Comparing the qK with
√
λKhK,K
gKσ2
. If qK >
√
λKhK,K
gKσ2
, remove user K from the game, set
K = K − 1, and go to Step 3; otherwise, go to Step 5.
• Step 5: With qK and K, the interference price µi for user i is given by
µi =

 qK
√
λihi,i
giσ2
, if i ≤ K
∞, otherwise.
(26)
It is observed from the above algorithm that, to obtain the optimal interference price vector µ∗, the MBS
has to measure and collect the network state information to compute λihi,i
giσ2
for each individual femtocell
user i. This will incur great implementation complexity and feedback overhead for the MBS and the HBSs.
To relieve this burden, we must reduce the amount of information that needs to be known at the MBS. In
the following, we consider the uniform pricing scheme, for which the MBS only needs to measure the total
received interference power
∑N
i=1 Ii(pi) from all the femtocell users to compute the optimal interference
price, via a new distributed interference price bargaining algorithm.
B. Uniform Pricing
For the uniform pricing scheme, the MBS sets a uniform interference price for all the femtocell users, i.e.,
µi = µ,∀i. With a uniform price µ, the optimal power allocation for femtocell users can be easily obtained
from (14) by setting µi = µ, i.e.,
p∗i =
(
λi
µgi
− σ
2
hi,i
)+
, ∀i. (27)
Then, at the MBS’s side, the optimization problem reduces to
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Problem 4.5:
max
µ>0
N∑
i=1
(
λi − µgiσ
2
hi,i
)+
, (28)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
(
λi
µ
− giσ
2
hi,i
)+
≤ Q. (29)
This problem has the same structure as Problem 4.2. Therefore, it can be solved by the same method for
Problem 4.2. Details are thus omitted here for brevity.
Corollary 4.1: Assuming that all the users are sorted in the order λ1h1,1
g1σ2
> · · · > λN−1hN−1,N−1
gN−1σ2
> λNhN,N
gNσ2
,
the optimal solution for Problem 4.5 is given by
µ∗ =


∑
N
i=1
λi
Q+
∑
N
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
, if Q > T˜N
∑
N−1
i=1
λi
Q+
∑
N−1
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
, if T˜N ≥ Q > T˜N−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
λ1
Q+
g1σ
2
h1,1
, if T˜2 ≥ Q > T˜1,
(30)
where T˜N =
∑
N
i=1
λi
λNhN,N
gNσ
2
−∑Ni=1 giσ2hi,i , T˜N−1 = ∑N−1i=1 λiλN−1hN−1,N−1
gN−1σ
2
−∑N−1i=1 giσ2hi,i , · · · , T˜2 = ∑2i=1 λiλ2h2,2
g2σ
2
−∑2i=1 giσ2hi,i ,
and T˜1 = λ1λ1h1,1
g1σ
2
− g1σ2
h1,1
= 0.
From Corollary 4.1, it is not to difficult to observe that the optimal price µ∗ is unique for a given Q.
Consequently, the SE for this Stackelberg game is unique and given as follows.
Corollary 4.2: The SE for the Stackelberg game for the uniform pricing case is (µ∗,p∗), where µ∗ is
given by (30), and p∗ is given by (27).
In practice, the Stackelberg game for the uniform-pricing case can be implemented in the same centralized
way as that for the non-uniform pricing case, which requires the MBS to collect a large amount of information
from each femtocell user. However, Problem 4.5 has some nice properties that can be explored for the
algorithm design. It is observed from Problem 4.5 that both the objective function and the left hand side of
(29) are monotonically decreasing functions of µ. Therefore, the objective function is maximized iff (29) is
satisfied with equality. By exploiting this fact, we propose the following algorithm to achieve the SE of the
Stackelberg game in the unform-pricing case.
Algorithm 4.2: Distributed Interference Price Bargaining
• Step 1: The MBS initializes the interference price µ, and broadcasts µ to all the femtocell users (e.g.,
through the HBSs via the backhaul links).
• Step 2: Each femtocell user calculates its optimal transmit power p∗i based on the received µ by (27),
and attempts to transmit with p∗i .
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• Step 3: The MBS measures the total received interference
∑N
i=1 Ii(pi), and updates the interference price
µ based on
∑N
i=1 Ii(pi). Assume that ǫ is a small positive constant that controls the algorithm accuracy.
Then, if
∑N
i=1 Ii(pi) > Q+ ǫ, the MBS increases the interference price by ∆µ; if
∑N
i=1 Ii(pi) < Q− ǫ,
the MBS decreases the interference price by ∆µ, where ∆µ > 0 is a small step size. After that, the
MBS broadcasts the new interference price to all the femtocells users.
• Step 4: Step 2 and Step 3 are repeated until
∣∣∑N
i=1 Ii(pi)−Q
∣∣ ≤ ǫ.
Remark: The convergence of Algorithm 4.2 is guaranteed due to the following facts: (i) the optimal µ is
obtained when (29) is satisfied with equality; and (ii) the left hand side of (29) is a monotonically decreasing
function of µ.
It is seen that Algorithm 4.2 is a distributed algorithm. At the MBS side, the MBS only needs to measure
the total received interference
∑N
i=1 Ii(pi). At the femtocell side, each femtocell user only needs to know
the channel gain to its own HBS to compute the transmit power. Overall, the amount of information that
needs to be exchanged in the network is greatly reduced, as compared to the centralized approach.
C. Non-Uniform Pricing vs. Uniform Pricing
In the following, we summarize the main results on comparing the two schemes of non-uniform pricing
and uniform pricing.
First, it is observed that the non-uniform pricing scheme must be implemented in a centralized way, while
the uniform pricing scheme can be implemented in a decentralized way. Therefore, uniform pricing is more
favorable when the network state information is not available.
Secondly, the non-uniform pricing scheme maximizes the revenue of the MBS, while the uniform pricing
scheme maximizes the sum-rate of the femtocell users. It is easy to observe that non-uniform pricing is optimal
from the perspective of revenue maximization of the MBS, as compared to uniform pricing. However, it is
not immediately clear that the uniform pricing scheme is indeed optimal for the sum-rate maximization of
the femtocell users. Hence, the following proposition affirms this property.
Proposition 4.4: For a given interference power constraint Q, the sum-rate of the femtocell users is
maximized by the uniform pricing scheme.
Proof: Please refer to Part C of the appendix.
V. DENSELY DEPLOYED SCENARIO
In this scenario, we assume that the femtocells are densely deployed within the region covered by the
macrocell. Therefore, the mutual interference between femtocells cannot be neglected. However, as previously
stated in the system model, it is still reasonable to assume that the aggregate interference at user i’s receiver
due to all other femtocell users is bounded, i.e.,
∑
j 6=i p
∗
jhi,j ≤ ε, where ε denotes the upper bound.
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For this scenario, we also consider two pricing schemes: non-uniform pricing and uniform pricing, which
are studied in the following two subsections, respectively.
A. Non-Uniform Pricing
Under the non-uniform pricing scheme, the MBS sets different interference prices for different femtocell
users. If we denote the interference price for user i as µi, the best responses for the noncooperative game
at the femtocell users’ side can be obtained by solving Problem 3.2 as follows.
For given p−i and µi, it is easy to verify that Problem 3.2 is a convex optimization problem. Thus, the best
response function for user i can be obtained by setting ∂Ui(pi,p−i,µi)
∂pi
to 0. Taking the first-order derivative
of (6), we have
∂Ui
(
pi,p−i, µi
)
∂pi
=
λi
pi
γi(pi,p−i)
+ pi
− µigi = 0. (31)
Substituting the γi
(
pi,p−i
)
given in (5) into (31) yields
p∗i =
(
λi
µigi
−
∑
j 6=i p
∗
jhi,j + σ
2
hi,i
)+
,∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} . (32)
For a given interference vector µ, (32) represents an N -user non-cooperative game. It is easy to verify that,
for a given interference vector µ, there exists at least one NE for the non-cooperative game defined by (32).
In general, there are multiple NEs, and thus it is NP-hard to get the optimal power allocation vector p∗.
Fortunately, since the aggregate interference is bounded, we may consider first the worst case, i.e.,∑
j 6=i p
∗
jhi,j = ε, ∀i. In this case, the best response functions of all users are decoupled in terms of pi’s. If
we denote ε + σ2 as θ, the revenue maximization problem at the MBS’s side will be exactly the same as
Problem 4.2, with σ2 replaced by θ. Therefore, the optimal interference price vectors can be obtained by
Theorem 4.1, with σ2 replaced by θ.
On the other hand, we may also consider the ideal case, i.e.,
∑
j 6=i p
∗
jhi,j = 0, ∀i. Then, the revenue
maximization problem at the MBS’s side will be exactly the same as Problem 4.2, and the optimal interference
price vector can be obtained by Theorem 4.1.
It is observed that the method used to solve the sparsely deployed scenario can be directly applied to
solve the densely deployed scenario by considering the worst case and the ideal case, respectively. It is not
difficult to show that the worst case and the ideal case serve as the lower bound and the upper bound on the
maximum achievable revenue of the MBS, respectively. Furthermore, these bounds will get closer to each
other with the decreasing of ε and eventually collide when ε = 0.
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B. Uniform Pricing
Under the uniform pricing scheme with µi = µ,∀i, the optimal power allocation for femtocell users can
be easily obtained from (32) as
p∗i =
(
λi
µgi
−
∑
j 6=i p
∗
jhi,j + σ
2
hi,i
)+
,∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} . (33)
Again, it is NP-hard to get the optimal power allocation vector p∗. Similarly, we can solve this problem by
either considering the worst case or the ideal case, for both of which the methods used to solve the sparsely
deployed scenario can be directly applied. Details are thus omitted for brevity. Last, it is worth noting that
the distributed interference price bargaining algorithm (Algorithm 4.2) can also be applied in the case of
ε > 0; however, the convergence of this algorithm is no more guaranteed due to the non-uniqueness of
NE solutions for the non-cooperate power game in (33). Nevertheless, the convergence of this algorithm is
usually observed in our numerical experiments when ε is sufficiently small.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, several numerical examples are provided to evaluate the performances of the proposed
resource allocation strategies based on the approach of interference pricing. For simplicity, we assume that
the variance of the noise is 1, and the payoff factors λi,∀i are all equal to 1.
A two-tier spectrum-sharing femtocell network with one MBS and three femtocells is considered. Without
loss of generality, the channel power gains are chosen as follows: h1,1 = 1, h2,2 = 1, h3,3 = 1, g1 = 0.01,
g2 = 0.1, and g3 = 1. In the following, the first three examples are for the sparsely deployed scenario, while
the last one is for the densely deployed scenario.
A. Example 1: Uniform Pricing vs. Non-Uniform Pricing: Throughput-Revenue Tradeoff
Figs. 2 and 3 show the macrocell revenue and the sum-rate of femtocell users, respectively, versus the
maximum tolerable interference margin Q at the MBS, with uniform or non-uniform pricing. It is observed
that for the same Q, the revenue of the MBS under the non-uniform pricing scheme is in general larger
than that under the uniform pricing scheme, while the reverse is generally true for the sum-rate of femtocell
users. These observations are in accordance with our discussions given in Section IV. In addition, it is
worth noting that when Q is sufficiently small, the revenues of the MBS become equal for the two pricing
schemes, so are the sum-rates of femtocell users. This is because when Q is very small, there is only one
femtocell active in the network, and thus by comparing (25) and (30), the non-uniform pricing scheme is
same as the uniform pricing counterpart in the single-femtocell case. It is also observed that when Q is
sufficiently large, the revenues of the MBS converge to the same value for the two pricing schemes. This
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can be explained as follows. For the non-uniform pricing scheme, when Q is very large, it is observed from
(25) that µi’s all become very small, and thus the objective function of Problem 4.2 converges to
∑N
i=1 λi
as Q→∞. On the other hand, for the uniform pricing scheme, the revenue of the MBS can be written as
µ∗Q at the optimal point, which is equal to Q
∑
N
i=1
λi
Q+
∑
N
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
when Q is very large (cf. (30)). Clearly, this value
will converge to
∑N
i=1 λi as Q→∞.
B. Example 2: Comparison of Interference Prices of Femtocell Users under Non-Uniform Pricing
In this example, we examine the optimal interference prices of the femtocell users vs. Q under non-uniform
pricing. First, it is observed from Fig. 4 that, for the same Q, the interference price for femtocell user 1 is the
highest, while that for femtocell user 3 is the lowest. This is true due the fact that λ1h1,1
g1σ2
> λ2h2,2
g2σ2
> λ3h3,3
g3σ2
,
where a larger λihi,i
giσ2
indicates that the corresponding femtocell can achieve a higher profit (transmission
rate) with the same amount network resource (transmit power) consumed. Therefore, the user with a larger
λihi,i
giσ2
has a willingness to pay a higher price to consume the network resource. Secondly, it is observed that
the differences between the interference prices decrease with the increasing of Q. This is due to the fact that∑
N
i=1
√
λigiσ
2
hi,i
Q+
∑
N
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
in (25) decreases with the increasing of Q. Lastly, it is observed that the interference prices
for all femtocell users decrease with the increasing of Q, which can be easily inferred from (25). Intuitively,
this can be explained by the practical rule of thumb that a seller would like to price lower if it has a large
amount of goods to sell.
C. Example 3: Convergence Performance of Distributed Interference Price Bargaining Algorithm
In this example, we investigate the convergence performance of the distributed interference price bargaining
algorithm (Algorithm 4.2). The initial value of µ is chosen to be 0.001. The ∆µ is chosen to be 0.001 ×
|∑Ni=1 Ii(pi)−Q|. The desired accuracy ǫ is chosen to be 10−6. It is observed from Fig. 5 that the distributed
bargaining algorithm converges for all values of Q. It is also observed that the convergence speed increases
with the increasing of Q. This is because ∆µ is proportional to |∑Ni=1 Ii(pi) − Q|, i.e., increasing Q is
equivalent to increasing the step size ∆µ, and consequently increases the convergence speed.
Actually, the convergence speed of the distributed bargaining algorithm can be greatly improved by
implementing it by the bisection method, for which the implementation procedure is as follows. First,
the MBS initializes a lower bound µL and an upper bound µH of the interference price. Then, the MBS
computes µM = (µL+µH)/2 and broadcasts µM to femtocell users. Receiving µM , femtocell users compute
their optimal transmit power and then transmit with the computed power. The MBS then measures the total
received interference
∑N
i=1 Ii(pi) from femtocell users. If
∑N
i=1 Ii(pi) < Q, the MBS sets µH = µM ;
otherwise, the MBS sets µL = µM . Then, µM is recomputed based on the new lower and upper bounds.
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The algorithm stops when |∑Ni=1 Ii(pi)−Q| is within the desired accuracy. It is observed from Fig. 6 that
the bisection method converges much faster than the simple subgradient-based method in Fig. 5.
D. Example 4: Densely Deployed Scenario under Unform Pricing
In this example, we investigate the macrocell revenue for the densely deployed scenario under uniform
pricing. First, it is observed from Fig. 7 that the ideal case of ε = 0 has the largest revenue of the MBS,
compared to the other two cases with ε = 0.5, 2. This verifies that the ideal case can serve as a revenue
upper bound for the densely deployed scenario. Secondly, the revenues of the MBS for all the three cases
of ε = 0, 0.5, 2 increase with the increasing of Q, similarly as expected for the sparsely deployed scenario.
Lastly, the revenue of the MBS is observed to increase with the decreasing of ε for the same Q, and the
revenue differences become smaller as Q increases.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, price-based power allocation strategies are investigated for the uplink transmission in a
spectrum-sharing-based two-tier femtocell network using game theory. An interference power constraint is
applied to guarantee the quality-of-service (QoS) of the MBS. Then, the Stackelberg game model is adopted
to jointly study the utility maximization of the MBS and femtocell users. The optimal resource allocation
schemes including the optimal interference prices and the optimal power allocation strategies are examined.
Especially, closed-form solutions are obtained for the sparsely deployed scenario. Besides, a distributed
algorithm that rapidly converges to the Stackelberg equilibrium is proposed for the uniform pricing scheme.
It is shown that the proposed algorithm has a low complexity and requires minimum information exchange
between the MBS and femtocell users. The results of this paper will be useful to the practical design of
interference control in spectrum-sharing femtocell networks.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 4.1
It is easy to observe that Problem 4.4 is a convex optimization problem. Thus, the dual gap between this
problem and its dual optimization problem is zero. Therefore, we can solve Problem 4.4 by solving its dual
problem.
The Lagrangian associated with Problem 4.4 can be written as
L (µ, α,β) =
N∑
i=1
µigiσ
2
hi,i
+ α
(
N∑
i=1
λi
µi
−Q−
N∑
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
)
−
N∑
i=1
βiµi, (34)
where α and βi are non-negative dual variables associated with the constraints
∑N
i=1
λi
µi
≤ Q+∑Ni=1 giσ2hi,i
and µi ≥ 0, respectively.
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The dual function is then defined as G (µ, α,β) = maxµ<0 L (µ, α,β) , and the dual problem is given
by minα≥0,β<0 G (µ, α,β) . Then, the KKT conditions can be written as follows:
∂L (µ, α,β)
∂µi
= 0,∀i, (35)
α
(
N∑
i=1
λi
µi
−Q−
N∑
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
)
= 0, (36)
βiµi = 0,∀i, (37)
α ≥ 0, (38)
βi ≥ 0,∀i, (39)
µi ≥ 0,∀i, (40)
N∑
i=1
λi
µi
−Q−
N∑
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
≤ 0. (41)
From (35), we have
∂L (µ, α,β)
∂µi
=
giσ
2
hi,i
− α λi
µ2i
− βi,∀i. (42)
Setting the above function equal to 0 yields
µ2i = α
λi
giσ2
hi,i
− βi
,∀i. (43)
Lemma 1: βi = 0,∀i.
Proof: Suppose that βi 6= 0 for any arbitrary i. Then, according to (37), it follows that µi = 0. From
(43), we know that µi = 0 indicates that α = 0, since λi > 0. Then, from (43), it follows that µi = 0,∀i,
which contradicts (41). Therefore, the preassumption that βi 6= 0 for any given i does not hold, and we thus
have βi = 0,∀i.
Lemma 2:
∑N
i=1
λi
µi
−Q−∑Ni=1 giσ2hi,i = 0.
Proof: Suppose that ∑Ni=1 λiµi −Q−∑Ni=1 giσ2hi,i 6= 0. Then, from (36), we have α = 0. Then, from (43),
it follows µi = 0,∀i, which contradicts (41). Therefore, the aforementioned preassumption does not hold,
and we have
∑N
i=1
λi
µi
−Q−∑Ni=1 giσ2hi,i = 0.
According to Lemma 1 and µi ≥ 0, (43) can be rewritten as
µi =
√
α
λihi,i
giσ2
,∀i. (44)
Substituting the above equation into (41) and according to Lemma 2, we have
√
α =
∑N
i=1
√
λigiσ2
hi,i
Q+
∑N
i=1
giσ2
hi,i
. (45)
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Then, substituting (45) back to (44) yields
µi =
√
λihi,i
giσ2
∑N
i=1
√
λigiσ2
hi,i
Q+
∑N
i=1
giσ2
hi,i
. (46)
Proposition 4.1 is thus proved.
B. Proof of Proposition 4.2
First, consider the proof of the “if” part. It is observed that the interference vector µ∗ given by (24) is
the optimal solution of Problem 4.2 if all the indicator functions are equal to 1, i.e., µi < λihi,igiσ2 ,∀ i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}.
Substituting (24) into the above inequalities yields√
λihi,i
giσ2
∑N
i=1
√
λigiσ2
hi,i
Q+
∑N
i=1
giσ2
hi,i
<
λihi,i
giσ2
,∀ i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} . (47)
Then, it follows
Q >
∑N
i=1
√
λigiσ2
hi,i√
λihi,i
giσ2
−
N∑
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
,∀ i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} . (48)
Furthermore, the inequalities given in (48) can be compactly written as
Q >
∑N
i=1
√
λigiσ2
hi,i
mini
√
λihi,i
giσ2
−
N∑
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
. (49)
The “if” part is thus proved.
Next, consider the “only if” part, which is proved by contradiction as follows.
For the ease of exposition, we assume that femtocell users are sorted by the following order:
λ1h1,1
g1σ2
> · · · > λN−1hN−1,N−1
gN−1σ2
>
λNhN,N
gNσ2
. (50)
Then, in Proposition 4.2, the condition becomes
Q > TN , where TN =
∑N
i=1
√
λigiσ2
hi,i√
λNhN,N
gNσ2
−
N∑
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
. (51)
Now, suppose TN−1 < Q ≤ TN , where TN−1 is a threshold shown later in (55). Suppose that µ∗ given
by (24) is still optimal for Problem 4.2 with TN−1 < Q ≤ TN . Then, since Q ≤ TN , from (24) it follows
that µ∗N ≥ λNhN,NgNσ2 and thus
(
λN
µ∗N
− gNσ2
hN,N
)+
= 0. From Problem 4.2, it then follows that µ∗1, . . . , µ∗N−1 must
be the optimal solution of the following problem
max
µ<0
N−1∑
i=1
(
λi − µigiσ
2
hi,i
)+
, (52)
s.t.
N−1∑
i=1
(
λi
µi
− giσ
2
hi,i
)+
≤ Q. (53)
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This problem has the same structure as Problem 4.2. Thus, from the proof of the previous “if” part, we
can show that the optimal solution for this problem is given by
µ⋆i =
√
λihi,i
giσ2
∑N−1
i=1
√
λigiσ2
hi,i
Q+
∑N−1
i=1
giσ2
hi,i
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N − 1} , (54)
if Q > TN−1, where TN−1 is obtained as the threshold for Q above which µ⋆i <
λihi,i
giσ2
holds ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , N − 1}, i.e.,
TN−1 =
∑N−1
i=1
√
λigiσ2
hi,i√
λN−1hN−1,N−1
gN−1σ2
−
N−1∑
i=1
giσ
2
hi,i
. (55)
Obviously, the optimal interference price solution in (54) for the above problem is different from µ∗
given by (24). Thus, this contradicts with our presumption that µ∗ is optimal for Problem 4.2 with TN−1 <
Q ≤ TN . Therefore, the interference vector µ∗ given by (24) is the optimal solution of Problem 4.2 only if
Q > TN . The “only if” part thus follows.
By combining the proofs of both the “if” and “only if” parts, Proposition 4.2 is thus proved.
C. Proof of Proposition 4.3
For a given interference power constraint Q, the sum-rate maximization problem of the femtocell network
can be formulated as
max
p<0
N∑
i=1
log
(
1 +
hi,ipi
σ2i
)
, (56)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
gipi ≤ Q. (57)
It is easy to observe that the sum-rate optimization problem is a convex optimization problem. The Lagrangian
associated with this problem can be written as
L (p, ν) =
N∑
i=1
log
(
1 +
hi,ipi
σ2i
)
− ν
(
N∑
i=1
gipi −Q
)
, (58)
where ν is the non-negative dual variable associated with the constraint
∑N
i=1 gipi ≤ Q.
The dual function is then defined as G (p, ν) = maxp<0 L (p, ν) , and the dual problem is minν≥0 G (p, ν) .
For a fixed ν, it is not difficult to observe that the dual function can also be written as
G (p, ν) = max
p<0
N∑
i=1
L˜ (pi, ν) + νQ, (59)
where
L˜ (pi, ν) = log
(
1 +
hi,ipi
σ2i
)
− νgipi. (60)
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Thus, the dual function can be obtained by solving a set of independent sub-dual-functions each for
one user. This is also known as the “dual decomposition” [19]. For a particular user, the problem can be
expressed as
max
pi>0
log
(
1 +
hi,ipi
σ2i
)
− νgipi. (61)
It can be seen that the dual variable ν plays the same role as the uniform price µ. It is easy to observe
that these sub-problems are exactly the same as the power allocation problems under the uniform pricing
scheme when ν = µ. Note that for the sum-rate maximization problem, ν is obtained when the interference
constraint is met with equality. Therefore, the optimal dual solution of ν is guaranteed to converge to µ∗
for the formulated Stackelberg game with uniform pricing.
Proposition 4.3 is thus proved.
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Fig. 1. System model of the femtocell network for the uplink transmission.
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Fig. 4. Interference prices for femtocell users vs. Q under non-uniform pricing.
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Fig. 5. Convergence performance of the distributed interference price bargaining algorithm with the subgradient search.
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Fig. 6. Convergence performance of the distributed interference price bargaining algorithm with the bisection search.
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